

APPENDIX B

**TO PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
ON COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL/ISSUE PRECLUSION IN
RELATION TO MOTION TO STAY**

APPENDIX B

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

and

**TOBACCO-FREE KIDS ACTION FUND,
AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY,
AMERICAN HEART ASSOCIATION,
AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION,
AMERICANS FOR NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS,
and NATIONAL AFRICAN AMERICAN
TOBACCO PREVENTION NETWORK,**

Intervenors,

v.

**PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.,
(f/k/a Philip Morris, Inc.), *et al.*,**

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 99-2496 (GK)

FINAL OPINION

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